Resilience: Attacks Against a Capped Entry
The resilience suite runs adversarial clients against an entry in a fixed box — by default 4 GiB of memory and 2 CPUs — and records what happens to the server, not how fast it is. The box is the instrument: an attack that exhausts memory OOM-kills the container, which is a signal we can read, instead of taking the host down. Nothing here is scored into the composite; it is a separate robustness read, the way the compliance columns are.
Every attack runs against a fresh capped container (a crash in one must not cost another its verdict), launched through the same path a benchmark uses — the real entry image, the real mounts — with the memory cap turned on. A connection the server reaps (closes on the client) is the correct defense: many reaped connections, with flat memory and a green liveness probe, mean the server defended itself.
The suite is opt-in per entry — the attacks are destructive and need the whole machine — and, once enabled, runs on the bench host as part of a benchmark. See Running & Tuning for how to opt an entry in and how to run it yourself.